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Art, Knowledge and Testimony
Abstract
In this paper we want to explore different epistemological benefits that we gain by dealing 
with some artworks, and our focus is on narrative arts. We claim that there is a sense in 
which narrative arts (e.g. literature, film and possibly even some expressions of visual art) 
can be similar to testimony, in that they provide information which can be epistemologi­
cally valuable for cognitive agents such as we are. We identify at least two broad categories 
of these epistemological benefits, the first one includes ‘facts stating’ and in that sense is 
parallel to the paradigmatic case of testimony in which what the testifier says can be a 
source of knowledge as mere acquisition of facts for his audience (this is the first case when 
we speak of artworks as ‘tellings’). This, however, is not the most peculiar and distinctive 
kind of epistemological benefits we can gain from art. The other one has to do with raising 
awareness, of deepening our understanding about some issues either by a specific, powerful 
and involving way of providing us facts (this is the second way in which we speak of art­
works as ‘tellings’), or by presenting us the stance, the attitude, the opinion of the artist that 













































































































comparative	 facts	 about	 these	 communities	 and	 the	 community	 to	which	 the	doctor	belongs	
–	 e.g.	 real	 statistics	 about	 behavioral	 phenomena	 in	 all	 these	 communities,	 or	 a	 comparison	








B.	 Nanay,	 “Narrative	 Pictures”,	 Journal of 






–	most	 genre	 fiction,	whodunit,	 spy,	 horror,	





has	 an	 evaluative	 element	 lacking	 in	 ‘fic-
tion’”.	(P.	Lamarque,	The Philosophy of Lit­





P.	 Lamarque,	 The Philosophy of Literature,	
chs.	2	and	5,	and	P.	Lamarque	and	S.	Haugom	
Olsen,	Truth, Fiction and Literature,	Claren-
don	Press,	Oxford,	1994,	268–289.
4
A.	 Millar,	 “Knowledge	 from	 Being	 Told”,	






gists,	 particularly	 those	 who	 embrace	 some	





C.	 Cowley,	 Medical Ethics, Ordinary Con­
cepts and Ordinary Lives, Basingstoke,	





























































































something	 that	we	can	actually	 see	 in	 the	 real	world.	Certainly	we	can	go	
to	Spain	and	see	the	places	Hemingway	describes	in	his	novels.	Apart	from	
	 8
This	 idea	 is	 nicely	 developed	 by	 Snježana	
Prijić-Samaržija	 (S.	Prijić-Samaržija,	 “Blind	





For	 different	 accounts	 of	 this,	 see,	 for	 ex-
ample:	 G.	 Graham,	 Philosophy of the Arts, 
Routledge,	London,	1997;	B.	Gaut, Art, Emo­








sometimes	 it	 is	hard	 to	pinpoint	where	 truth	
ends	 and	 imagination	 begins.	 Sometimes	 a	








































































The	other	 kind	of	 descriptions	we	mentioned	 is	 indirect	 description,	when	
the	author	describes,	for	example,	a	certain	kind	of	character,	through	an	im-
aginary	 figure	 (Ana	Karenina	 representing	unhappily	married	woman	who	
succumbs	to	the	temptation	of	adultery)	or	a	certain	kind	of	society	through	a	
description	of	an	imagined	state	(like	Orwell	does	in	1984).











































problem	 with	 romantic	 relationships	 and	
women	are	in	fact	very	similar	to	Lawrence’s	
own	experience	and	connection	to	his	mother:	





History of Literature in English,	Routledge,	
London,	 1997).	Many	other	writers	 use	 real	
life	 people	 or	 situation	 as	 inspiration,	 this	
goes	for	characters	found	in	Fitzgerald,	Hem-




J.	 Gibson,	 “Between	 Truth	 and	 Triviality”,	
British Journal of Aesthetics,	 43	 (3),	 2003,	
224–237.
14
Lamarque	 attributes	 this	 idea	 to	 Nicholas	
Wolterstorff.	See	P.	Lamarque,	The Philoso­
phy of Literature,	 192.	However,	 the	whole	










By	 this	 we	 do	 not	 want	 to	 avoid	 neutral-
ity	 in	 relation	 to	 the	question	about	whether	
contribution	 to	 advancement	 of	 knowledge,	
or	 other	 cognitive	 benefits,	 are	 an	 aspect	 of	
the	artistic	value	of	artworks.	It	may	be	that	
advancement	 of	 knowledge,	 or	 other	 cogni-
tive	 benefits,	 are	 a	 contingent	 benefit	 from	
art,	 and	 that	 the	 constraints	 depend	 only	 on	
genre	 conventions.	An	 example	 of	 how	 the	
two	are	 combined	 is	 provided	by	Lamarque	
(although	he	does	not	believe	 that	 cognitive	
value	advances	artistic	value),	 in	his	discus-
sion	 on	 “accuracy	 and	 genre	 conventions”	











real	world	neo-Nazis	do	not	behave	 like	 in	 this	 film,	 this	 film	would	most	
certainly	loose	its	appeal.
In	virtue	of	 these	constraints,	we	can	say	 that	we	may	 take	some	artworks	
to	be	reliable	source	of	information.	The	problem	is	that	we	must	recognize	
which	artworks	operate	under	these	constraints	–	namely,	the	constraints	to	
tell	 the	 truth	–	and	which	do	not.	We	can	do	 this	by	various	 interpretative	




























































































these	 very	 general	 propositions	 are	 seldom	
defended	or	argued	for	in	works	of	literature.	
This	 makes	 the	 literary	 context	 seem	 very	
different	 from	 the	 philosophic	 or	 scientific	
one,	where	reasoning	and	evidence	are	para-
mount.”	(P.	Lamarque,	The Philosophy of Lit­
erature,	235)
18





ture,	and	Moral	Knowledge”,	The Journal of 











































acters	and	 situations	 (…).”20	 In	discussing	a	passage	 from,	Ruth	Rendell’s	

















































and	The Picture of Dorian Gray. In	Oedipus Rex	Sophocles	does	not	describe	
any	real	world	fact,	but	expresses	a	moral	vision	that	concerns	 the	relation	







B.	Gaut, Art, Emotion and Ethics, 188.
21
B.	Gaut,	Art, Emotion and Ethics,	188–189.	
Description	 of	 the	 scene	 of	 the	 murder	 to	
which	he	refers	is	the	following:	“Blood	has	
splashed	 the	 dark-green	 papered	 walls,	 the	
green	and	gold	lampshades	in	which	the	bulbs	
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Well,	to	begin	with,	none	that	are	as	direct	as	in	the	case	of	Daumier’s	picture,	


















































































face	 in	 real	 life	 situations,	 and	 that	 it	 helps	us	 face	 these	 situations	with	 a	
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P.	 Lamarque,	 The Philosophy of Literature,	
237.
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T.	 Zamir,	Double Vision.	Moral Philosophy 
and Shakespearean Drama,	 Princeton	 Uni-
versity	Press,	Princeton,	2006,	129–150.
25




imagination	 which	 then	 helps	 us	 see	 what	
would	be	like	for	us	to	undergo	some	experi-
ence.	In	that	sense,	Gaut	claims,	art	can	teach	




claim:	 “Although	 individual	 aspects,	 char-









one	 that	will	 be	 relevant	 to	 a	 reader’s	 daily	
life”	 (P.	 Lamarque	 and	 S.	 Haugom	 Olsen,	
Truth, Fiction and Literature,	378.	Lamarque	
again	 emphasizes	 the	 same	point	 in	 his	The 
Philosophy of Literature,	248).
27
This	 is	 captured	 by	 the	 so-called	 “mimetic	
aspect”	of	literature.	See	P.	Lamarque	and	S.	










us;	we	wanted	 to	 show	 that	 at	 least	 some	 narrative	 arts	 are	 rather	 similar	
in	 structure	 to	 testimony,	which	 is	 epistemologically	 recognized	 source	 of	
knowledge.	However,	contrary	to	usual	testimony,	the	most	peculiar	and	dis-
tinctive	contribution	of	artwork	is	not	represented	by	mere	providing	of	facts,	
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Umjetnost, znanje, svjedočanstvo
Sažetak
U ovom radu želimo istražiti različite epistemološke koristi koje dobivamo putem nekih umjet­
ničkih djela, pri čemu smo primarno usredotočeni na narativne umjetnosti. Tvrdimo da u odre­
đenom smislu, narativne umjetnosti (primjerice književnost, film a i neka djela vizualne umjet­
nosti) mogu biti slične svjedočanstvu, utoliko što pružaju informacije koje mogu biti epistemo­
loški vrijedne za kognitivne djelatnike kakvi smo mi. Razlikujemo barem dvije šire kategorije 
tih epistemoloških vrijednosti, od kojih prva uključuje ‘navođenje činjenica’ i u tom je smislu 
pandan paradigmatskom slučaju svjedočanstva u kojem ono što informator govori može biti 
izvor znanja za publiku koja time naprosto dobiva činjenice (ovo je prvi slučaj, kada govorimo 
o umjetničkim djelima kao o ‘tellings’). Međutim, to nije najsvojstvenija i najznačajnija vrsta 
epistemoloških vrijednosti koje dobijemo iz umjetnosti. Druga kategorija tiče se povećavanja 
svijesti ili produbljivanja razumijevanja o nekom fenomenu, koji se može odvijati na dva na­
čina: ili pružanjem činjenica na specifično snažan i prožimalački način (ovo je drugi smisao 
u kojem o umjetničkom djelu možemo govoriti kao o ‘tellings’), ili prezentiranjem stajališta, 
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Kunst, Wissen und Zeugnis
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Paper möchten wir den unterschiedlichen epistemologischen Vorzügen auf den Grund 
gehen, die wir in der Arbeit mit einigen Kunstwerken erlangen, wobei unser Schwerpunkt in 
der narrativen Kunst liegt. Wir behaupten, die narrativen Künste (z. B. Literatur, Film und 
möglicherweise überdies einzelne Ausdrücke der visuellen Kunst) könnten in gewissem Sinne 
dem Zeugnis ähneln, insofern sie Informationen besorgten, die epistemologisch wertvoll für 
kognitive Agenten wie uns seien. Wir identifizieren zumindest zwei breite Kategorien dieser 
epistemologischen Vorzüge, die Erste schließt „Tatsachenangaben“ ein und ist in diesem Sinne 
vergleichbar mit dem paradigmatischen Fall des Zeugnisses, wo die Aussagen des Zeugen als 
Wissensquelle, als bloße Faktenaneignung für sein Publikum zu dienen vermögen (dies re­
präsentiert den ersten Fall, welcher von den Kunstwerken als den „Tellings“ handelt). Dies 
dagegen ist nicht die eigenartigste und distinktivste Art der epistemologischen Werte, die uns 
die Kunst verschafft. Die andere hat es mit der Bewusstseinssteigerung sowie Verständnisver­
tiefung bezüglich gewisser Fragestellungen zu tun, entweder durch spezifische, kraftvolle und 
involvierende Art der Tatsachenvermittlung (dies repräsentiert den zweiten Fall, wo die Rede 
von den Kunstwerken als den „Tellings“ ist), oder eben durch die Präsentierung der Haltung, 
Einstellung oder Ansicht des Künstlers, welche sich für uns als erhellend oder herausfordernd 
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Art, connaissance et témoignage
Résumé
Dans cet article, nous souhaitons étudier les différents avantages épistémologiques qu’on 
tire de certains ouvrages artistiques, en nous focalisant sur les arts narratifs. Nous affirmons 
que, dans un certain sens, les arts narratifs (ex. lettres, cinéma, mais aussi certaines formes 
d’expressions de l’art visuel) peuvent ressembler au témoignage, dans la mesure où ils four­
nissent des informations susceptibles d’être épistémologiquement précieuses aux acteurs co­
gnitifs que nous sommes. Nous distinguons au moins deux catégories larges de ces avantages 
épistémologiques. La première comprend « l’énoncé des faits » et dans ce sens représente le 
pendant du cas paradigmatique de témoignage où, ce que le témoin dit, peut être source de 
connaissance pour le public qui de cette manière reçoit simplement les faits (il s’agit du premier 
cas, celui où nous parlons des ouvrages artistiques comme « tellings »). Cependant, cette sorte 
d’avantage épistémologique n’est pas la plus originale ou la plus pertinente qu’on puisse tirer 
de l’art. L’autre catégorie concerne l’accroissement de la conscience ou l’approfondissement 
de la compréhension de certains phénomènes, soit en rapportant les faits d’une façon spéci­
fique, puissante et engageante (ceci est la deuxième façon dont nous considérons les ouvrages 
d’art comme « tellings »), soit en présentant la position, l’attitude ou l’opinion de l’artiste, qui 
puissent nous être révélateurs ou provocateurs.
Mots-clés
Arts	narratifs,	lettres,	témoignage,	connaissance,	avantages	épistémologiques
